What does non-saving mean in this context?

Non-active means “we are missing things because we are not guaranteed, especially in the presence of enemies or when the volume is really high.” Also, the “package relay” in quotes refers to the fact that there is no package relay protocolpart of the opportunistic logic that can be seen when an orphanage transaction happens to be CPFping a failed transaction with low refueling.

Perhaps a good similarity is if you’re a restaurant chef who doesn’t have a dedicated server. Once you’re finished cooking, you can opportunistically bring food to the table, which is often fine, but delayed during rush hour. The ticket system is also not evaluated. If you can’t keep all the tickets, then random tickets will fall to the ground and forget to order them. One annoying customer can ruin someone else’s dining experience by ordering 100 diet cokes.

We can hire others to serve food. It certainly makes the restaurant more efficient (e.g. BIP 331, still WIP), but it doesn’t solve everything. Starting from 30.0, there is a strategy to limit customers to rates so they don’t forget to send out huge amounts (see “P2P: Improve Service Boundaries in Txorphanage” https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/31829).

Are there any situations where parents’ transactions cannot be confirmed yet?

The most important limitation of 28.0 is that Cook can only offer something very simple (1P1C package). Anything above 1P1C will not work. If the child has another unconfirmed parent, the logic of opportunism will not work, even if it is already in Mempools. This has also been changed (“Package Validation: Relax the package.

When broadcasting a transaction via SendRawTransaction, Bitcoin Core 28.0 automatically forms a 1P1C package

That’s the right thing to do. When you send a transaction to Mempool, the node does everything automatically. If it is a 0-FEE parent + child package, sendrawtransaction You might complain about the fees, so you submitpackage RPC (equivalent to multi-transactions sendrawtransaction (with a very similar API). RPCs also accept single transactions, so it may be most convenient to use them all the time.

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Ethereum has just marked 10 years since its launch. It rolled out a symbolic NFT called “The Ethereum Torch” to honor its community.

The token will travel from one wallet to another day by day. Then it will be burned to make way for a fresh celebratory NFT that anyone can mint for free.

Ethereum Torch Tour Highlights Community Spirit

According to the Ethereum Foundation’s X account, Joseph Lubin, a co‑founder of Ethereum and founder of ConsenSys, will kick off the torch as its first holder on July 21.

After 24 hours in his wallet, the torch moves on. It will spend 10 days hopping across a selected list of community members. Based on reports, each handover is chosen to show off the network’s global reach.

0/ The Ethereum Torch is now lit.

The Torch is an NFT honoring the people and values that have shaped Ethereum’s first decade and will help build its future.

It will be symbolically passed from wallet to wallet in the 10 days leading up to Ethereum’s 10 year anniversary. pic.twitter.com/nEIY8JOIna

— Ethereum (@ethereum) July 20, 2025

The torch will wrap up its journey on July 30, when the Foundation plans to burn the NFT. That burn is meant to close out one era of the network and launch the next.

After the burn, a brand new torch will be freely claimable through the official Ether website, giving more people a piece of the celebration.

NFT Market Sees Notable Revival

On‑chain data shows a sharp rebound in NFT trading. Total weekly sales across all blockchains topped $110 million last week.

Ethereum projects accounted for about $75 million of that sum. That represents a 300% jump from figures two weeks earlier.

The spike arrived alongside a 50% rise in ETH price since July 6. Collectors and traders are turning back to digital art and collectibles in growing numbers.

Based on reports, this uptick could signal renewed confidence after a weak 2024, when NFT trading fell 18% compared to 2023.

Cross‑Chain Activity And Big Purchases

Other blockchains posted mixed results. Bitcoin‑based collectibles hit almost $26 million in weekly volume. That’s nearly double the $11 million registered in early July.

Polygon trading made a slight retreat during the same period. These shifts suggest interest is spreading but still centers on major players.

Meanwhile, Cboe BZX has filed an application for a new ETF with Canary Capital. The move would hold PENGU tokens tied to the Pudgy Penguins collection.

Featured image from Unsplash, chart from TradingView

Editorial Process for bitcoinist is centered on delivering thoroughly researched, accurate, and unbiased content. We uphold strict sourcing standards, and each page undergoes diligent review by our team of top technology experts and seasoned editors. This process ensures the integrity, relevance, and value of our content for our readers.

The diagram means that the receiving node can relay the block before it finishes processing.

What do you want to know about the actual situation with Bitcoin Core?

I think this is safe:

1. Completely receive blocks (critical path)
2. Check the routes for Pow and Merkle first (Critical Path)
3. relays the block (can be done by other threads, not by critical paths)
4. Completely validate and connect blocks (critical path)
5. Start mining new tips (critical path)

So, what is the delay between receiving and sending?

In the final Mempool article, we discussed the different types of relay policy filters, why they exist, and ultimately the incentives that determine how effective each class of filters are to prevent confirmation of transactions of different classes. In this article, we will examine the dynamics of a relay network if some nodes on the network are running different relay policies compared to other nodes.

If a node on the network runs a homogenous relay policy with Mempool, all transactions must propagate throughout the network, given that they pay the minimum salary that should not be ousted from the node’s memory during a large transaction backlog. This is changed if different nodes on the network are running heterogeneous policies.

The Bitcoin Relay Network works on a best effort basis using what is called a flood filling architecture. This means that when a transaction is received on one node, it is forwarded to all other nodes except for the node that received the transaction. This is a highly inefficient network architecture, but in the context of a distributed system, it provides a high degree of assurance that transactions will ultimately reach the intended destination, the miner.

Introducing filters in a node’s relay policy to theoretically limit relays of other valid transactions will introduce friction in the propagation of that transaction, reducing the reliability of the network’s ability to perform this function. In reality, things aren’t that simple.

The amount of friction prevents propagation

Let’s take a look at a simplified example of various network node configurations. The next graphics blue node represents it Intention Consensus propagates any class of valid transactions, and the red node is do not have Propagate these transactions. The set of miners is centrally shown as a simple expression of where the transaction user ultimately wants to ultimately engulf the transaction.

This is a model for networks where nodes that reject the propagation of these transactions are clearly minority. As you can clearly see, nodes on the network that accept them have a clear path to relay them to the miners. Two nodes attempting to limit transaction propagation across the network will not affect the final receipt by the miner node.

In this diagram, we see that almost half of the sample network has a filtering policy for this class of transactions. Nevertheless, only a portion of the network propagating these transactions is blocked from the path to the miner. The remaining nodes without filtering still have a clear path to the miners. This introduced some degree of friction in a subset of users, but allows other users to freely engage in the propagation of these transactions.

Even users affected by filtering nodes require only a single connection to the rest of the network node (or direct connection to the miner) that is not detached from the miner to remove that friction. If your actual relay network has a similar configuration to this example, then it is all you need to do is a single new connection to mitigate the problem.

In this scenario, only a small number of networks are actually propagating these transactions. The rest of the network is engaged in policy filtering to prevent propagation. However, even in this case, the unfiltered node still has a clear path to propagate to the miners.

Only this small, small, unfiltering nodes are needed to ensure final propagation to miners. Preferred peering logic, that is, functionality to ensure that nodes prefer peer or relay policies that implement the same software version. These types of solutions can ensure that peers who propagate something to others cannot find each other and maintain connections between themselves throughout the network.

Tolerant minority

As you can see these different examples, even in the face of the overwhelming majority of public networks engaged in filtering certain classes of transactions, what is needed to successfully propagate through the network to miners is the small number of networks that propagate and relay them.

These nodes essentially create “subnetworks” within the larger public relay network through technical mechanisms, ensuring that from users engaged in these types of transactions there is a viable path to minors who are willing to include them in the block.

There is essentially nothing you can do to counter this dynamically, except for carrying out a civil attack on all these nodes. Also, a cibil attack requires a single honest connection to be completely defeated. Similarly, honest nodes that create very large numbers of connections with other nodes on the network can increase the cost of such civil attacks to the de-capacity. The more connections you create, the more civil nodes you need to spin in order to consume all the connection slots.

What if there are no minorities?

So what happens if there are no tolerant minorities? In that case, what happens to transactions in this class?

If users still need to create them and pay the miner, they will be confirmed. Minor simply sets up the API. The role of miners is to confirm the trade, and the reason they do so is to maximize profits. Miners are not selfless, not moral or ideologically motivated, they are business. They exist to make money.

If there are users who are willing to pay for a particular type of transaction, and the entire public relay network refuses to propagate those transactions to miners to include them in the block, the miners create another way for users to submit those transactions to them.

It’s a reasonable move to make as a profit motivating actor when there are customers who want to pay you.

Relay policies are not a consensus alternative

At the end of the day, if the relay policy is consensus in effect, the relay policy cannot successfully censor the transaction if the user is willing to pay. Miners have no extended status such as the user’s willingness to pay (such as spending time checking damage or savings to nodes on the network, i.e. time on consumer PCs, etc.).

If some classes of transactions are deemed truly undesirable by Bitcoin users and node operators, there is no solution to stop them from being seen on blockchains approaching enacting and disabling consensus changes.

If filtering policies implemented in relay networks can prevent transactions from being seen, then Bitcoin will not be able to withstand censorship.

A new malware-as-a-service (MaaS) platform named ‘SuperCard X’ has emerged, targeting Android devices via NFC relay attacks that enable point-of-sale and ATM transactions using compromised payment card data.

SuperCard X is linked to Chinese-speaking threat actors and shows code similarities with the open-source project NFCGate and its malicious spawn, NGate, which has facilitated attacks in Europe since last year.

The malware-as-a-service platform is promoted through Telegram channels that also offer direct support to “customers.”

SuperCard X was discovered by mobile security firm Cleafy, which reports seeing attacks utilizing this Android malware in Italy. These attacks involved multiple samples with subtle differences, indicating that affiliates are offered the option of custom builds tailored to regional or other specific needs. 

How SuperCard X attacks unfold

The attack begins with the victim receiving a fake SMS or WhatsApp message impersonating their bank, claiming they need to call a number to resolve issues caused by a suspicious transaction.

The call is answered by a scammer posing as bank support, who uses social engineering to trick the victim into “confirming” their card number and PIN. They then attempt to convince the user to remove spending limits via their banking app.

Finally, the threat actors convince users to install a malicious app (Reader) disguised as a security or verification tool that contains the SuperCard X malware.

Upon installation, the Reader app requests only minimal permissions, mainly access to the NFC module, which is enough to perform the data theft.

The scammer instructs the victim to tap their payment card to their phone to verify their cards, allowing the malware to read the card chip data and send it to the attackers.

The attackers receive this data on their Android device, which runs another app called Tapper, which emulates the victim’s card using the stolen data.

These ’emulated’ cards allow attackers to make contactless payments at stores and ATM withdrawals, though amount limits apply. As these small transactions are instant and appear legitimate to the banks, they’re harder to flag and reverse.

Evasive malware

Cleafy notes that SuperCard X is currently not flagged by any antivirus engines on VirusTotal and the absence of risky permission requests and aggressive attack features like screen overlaying ensures it stays off the radar of heuristic scans.

The emulation of the card is ATR-based (Answer to Reset), which makes the card appear legitimate to payment terminals and shows technical maturity and understanding of smartcard protocols.

Another notable technical aspect is the use of mutual TLS (mTLS) for certificate-based client/server authentication, securing C2 communications from interception and analysis by researchers or law enforcement.

BleepingComputer contacted Google to comment on the SuperCard X activity and a spokesperson sent the below statement.

“Based on our current detection, no apps containing this malware are found on Google Play. Android users are automatically protected by Google Play Protect, which is on by default on Android devices with Google Play Services. Google Play Protect can warn users or block apps known to exhibit malicious behavior, even when those apps come from sources outside of Play.” – A Google spokesperson