Scalability Context

As far as I know, most academic articles on Bitcoin scalability focus on the limits to transactions per second. This appears to be greater concern than the upper limit on the number of nodes.

Another issue that we think is more careful about is the size of blockchain data that all full nodes need to store and handle. See “Shards” and more.

Maximum node

Put your internet bandwidth and more aside. One limitation of the number of nodes is that if the network-wide gossip protocol delay is close or more than the 10 minute block interval, the network is likely to be split naturally. I think an indicator of an approach to this could be an increase in the number of small-scale re-growings.

I think this issue depends heavily on the maximum number of hops between two nodes (or important groups of nodes) where one hop communicates with one bitcoin node (or a key group of nodes) (each can intrude in many IP routing hops.

I think this is probably related to the concept of the “version era” of information within gossip networks. There are many articles on this more general issue (example)

Data Sultput probably has no constraint on the number of nodes, as the data throughput of synchronized nodes is not dependent on the network size. Overhead at about 4 MB per 10 minutes. In the case of SPV nodes, they can form a majority in large networks.

Note that the above is speculation and not quantified.

and onion=... You just say bitcoind How to create an outbound connection to a TOR network. To be able to reach yourself on a TOR network, you need something called a “hidden service,” which corresponds to the IP address on the TOR network. TOR is quite unusual in that it does not require such an address to make an outbound connection. It is necessary simply to receive an inbound connection.

For more information about how to create hidden services, see the Bitcoin Core Tor documentation. However, there are about two ways.

• give bitcoind Permission to ask tor Creates a hidden service (by opening the control port).
• Set it tor Create a hidden service for yourself and transfer it yourself bitcoindyou need to tell them what that hidden service address is (and therefore can be advertised to other peers).

Several technology companies have joined Nillion’s newly launched Enterprise Cluster — an initiative aimed at extending decentralized applications beyond cryptocurrencies into privacy-focused use cases such as healthcare, financial management and enterprise data sharing.

As part of the partnership, Deutsche Telekom, Alibaba Cloud, STC Bahrain and Pairpoint by Vodafone are operating infrastructure nodes on Nillion’s decentralized compute platform, the company announced Thursday.

The Enterprise Cluster enables organizations to run privacy-critical applications on decentralized infrastructure, helping to minimize the trade-offs between the risks of centralized systems and the limitations of blockchain-based privacy.

“For the first time, organizations can compute on encrypted data across decentralized clusters, without sacrificing privacy,” Nillion’s co-founder and chief scientist, Miguel de Vega, told Cointelegraph. “It’s proof that privacy-first computation is now enterprise-ready infrastructure.”

Nillion is a decentralized network focused on secure data storage and computation. Its core technology, Nil Message Compute, enables encrypted data to be processed without decryption.

As previously reported by Cointelegraph, Nillion raised $25 million in October, bringing its total funding to $50 million.

Before the fundraise, Nillion’s technology was integrated with the Aptos network to support privacy-focused applications.

Related: Ethereum privacy roadmap proposes EU GDPR-safe blockchain design

Blockchain privacy has never left the spotlight

Nillion’s technology aims to address what it describes as a “longstanding dilemma” — the inherent privacy limitations of blockchain systems.

These limitations have faced heightened scrutiny in 2025, as global crypto regulations increasingly target privacy tools, including mixers, zero-knowledge proofs, stealth addresses and self-custodied wallets.

As Cointelegraph noted, the debate over privacy in blockchain is far from settled. Emerging technologies continue to challenge the notion that anonymity should automatically be viewed as a criminal threat.

Traditionally, protecting sensitive data on the blockchain has relied on keeping it entirely offchain or encrypting it onchain. However, as Midnight CEO Eran Barak warned, onchain encryption does not “provide durable privacy” in light of the rapid advances in quantum computing.

Despite the public debate, several privacy-focused projects continue to gain traction, particularly in the areas of zero-knowledge proofs and decentralized identity.

Related: Crypto projects prepare to battle for privacy in Switzerland

]]> https://earlybirdsinvest.com/deutsche-telekom-alibaba-cloud-vodafone-are-running-nodes-on-nillion/feed/ 0 41639 https://earlybirdsinvest.com/vitalik-buterin-backs-36-day-ethereum-node-history-limit-so-users-can-run-personal-nodes/ https://earlybirdsinvest.com/vitalik-buterin-backs-36-day-ethereum-node-history-limit-so-users-can-run-personal-nodes/#respond Mon, 19 May 2025 10:16:36 +0000 https://earlybirdsinvest.com/vitalik-buterin-backs-36-day-ethereum-node-history-limit-so-users-can-run-personal-nodes/

Hello LND Developers and Community,

Despite being fully synchronized after Bitcoin core node (v29.0.0, RPI5 fresh IBD, txindex = 1), we are facing a very unusual and important issue that on-chain funds related to past LND channel closures are inaccessible. However, both the ListUnSpent software and the external wallet software (Sparrow) are unable to view this UTXO, and importantly, the address holding the fund cannot be derived from my LND root key using standard methods.

System and history:

LND: v0.18.5-beta (upgraded from v0.5.2-beta). Only one wallet.db has been identified that is used throughout.

Bitcoin Core: V29.0.0 (RPI5), fully synced, IBD, TXINDEX = 1 report synced: true. Datadir/MNT/HDD/BITCOIN.

Channel History: Opened in March 2019 (LND V0.5.2, Funding TX: 7060 … 9D71), later closed the power by peers.

Sweep Transaction: April 1, 2024 (block 837257), TX 4C0407B1188E0BA39313B1D9C87C49F6C81D99AA2839026C8AF8C989CE102244 used the channel output and sent 0.01495 BTC to P2WPHH. BC1QT728QPLPUH6D98EVKL4A990ZDHWPWVUR6QG8QZ.

On-Chain Verification: Explorers confirm that this UTXO (4C04 …:0) is present and does not exist in BC1QT7 … G8QZ.

Core Issues and Conflicts:

After full IBD, make sure the txindex is synced on the Bitcoin Core node.

getrawtransaction 4c04... true Success: Node knows the history of funding transactions.

scantxoutset start '("addr(bc1qt7...)")' Returns UTXO successfully. This directly confirms that the node’s chainstate (UTXO set) database is correct and contains the previous output of BC1QT7 … G8QZ.

{
  "success": true, ...
  "unspents": ( { "txid": "4c04...", "vout": 0, ... "address": "bc1qt7...", "amount": 0.01495437 ... } ),
  "total_amount": 0.01495437
}

listunspent ... '("bc1qt7...")' (use -rpcwallet="" or any other loaded wallet) Returns (): Despite the UTXO present in the chain state, wallet-specific RPC calls cannot list it.

Sparrow Wallet (a fresh install connected to this node) shows a balance of 0. Import the confirmed LND root XPRV and configure BIP84 (M/84’/0’/0”, native Segwit P2WPKH), Sparrow completes the scan, but shows 0 balance and uses utxos.

Parallel Wallet Derived Failure:

Verified root XPRV (extracted from the correct Wallet.db via Chantools Showrootkey), using extensive checks using the offline tool (bip39-Standalone.html) (m/84’/0’/0’/0’/* and m/84’/0’/0’/0’/1/*). BC1QT728QPLPUH6D98EVKL4A990ZDHWPWVUR6QG8QZAfter checking millions of addresses.

Current Status and Emergency Questions:

I have an on-chain fund in bc1qt7…g8qz (per scantxoutset) the nodes fundamentally know, but they are not accessible via standard wallet RPC (listunspent) and external wallet (sparrow). To consolidate this is that you cannot derive this particular address from the LND root key using the standard BIP84 path.

Seek expert help:

Why can’t external wallets like Sparrow and external wallets like Sparrow not display UTXO when ScantxOutset on the same node confirm its presence in the UTXO set? Is this a known core bug, an issue with how Wallets queries addresses other than owners, or is it something else?

Given the derivation failure, is it possible for LND (especially after major version jump) to wipe out funds from the Aezeed root key to addresses that cannot be derived via the standard BIP84 path? Is a bug or a particular state likely to lead to using different derivation schemes, or can you use important keys that are unrelated to the main wallet in the sweep output?

Advanced methods or tools (LND debug commands, using specific Chantools, alternative wallet software known to handle edge cases) are:

a) Force Sparrow/LND to recognize UTXO based on node chain state confirmation?

b) Does it help clearly track the derived paths (even non-standard) used to generate bc1qt7…g8qz from wallet.db/xprv?

This situation seems very unusual. The insights and guidance are highly appreciated.

thank you.

I know that I can announce a channel between the two peers or do it without notice. However, even if the channel is public, the channel balance has not been revealed. As far as I know, this is a concern about the efficiency of routing in Lightning networks.

Why can’t peers opt out of this privacy constraint (along with other peers’ agreements) and reveal the balance between improving routing and network efficiency? Clearing channel balance reduces privacy, but connected peers can benefit financially from doing so.

For example, large LN nodes belonging to the exchange are very likely to agree to this. They are already well known, so they earn more economic benefits and have little privacy concerns. If they don’t care about privacy, this is a win-win situation.

Basically, we sell your information to make more money.