It reads the Bitcoin Core LevelDB index (block/index) and uses the Blockstatus flag to determine if the block is valid and part of the active chain.

Currently using the following checks:

if ((BlockStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) >= BLOCK_VALID_CHAIN)

This seems to work for most blocks, but fails at block 0. 11.
As a result, the condition is evaluated error.

I think this is because block 0 is hardcoded and is probably handled differently by core.
So my question is:

1. Is this a reasonable proxy that assumes that the block is fully validated based solely on LevelDB metadata? Or is this check essentially unreliable for that purpose?
2. How does Bitcoin Core handle block status internally for block 0?
3. You must skip block 0 and apply this check only to blocks
   height > 0?

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is taking action against a former bank employee who allegedly sold check images that resulted in a six-figure loss for the lender.

The OCC says it’s issuing an order of prohibition against Cricel Santamaria, a former client service representative at Webster Bank in Stamford, Connecticut.

Says the OCC,

“From approximately April 2019 until May 23, 2022, the respondent was employed at the bank. Between approximately October 2021 and April 2022, the respondent obtained approximately 62 check images from the bank’s internal systems and made them available for sale over the internet.

Thirteen bank customers reported fraud on their accounts shortly after their checks were made available for sale on the internet. The total fraud reported was $237,374 and the total Bank loss was approximately $108,000.”

According to the OCC, Santamaria “engaged in unsafe or unsound practices, caused more than a minimal loss to the bank, demonstrated personal dishonesty and willful or continuing disregard for the safety and soundness of the bank.”

The OCC order prohibits the ex-banker from working in the banking and financial services industry.

Santamaria consents to the OCC order without admitting or denying any wrongdoing. Under the order, the Department of Justice (DOJ) retains its right to “bring other actions deemed appropriate” against Santamaria.

The Webster Bank, a commercial bank based in Stamford, Connecticut, has more than $70 billion in assets under management.

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A fraudster who drained hundreds of thousands of dollars from an elderly victim’s account is now staring at the possibility of spending decades behind bars.

Cuban national Michel Duarte Suarez has pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and mail fraud and one count of aggravated identity theft after stealing about $803,000 from his victim’s bank account over a four-month period.

Court documents show that Suarez told a confidential informant in March 2022 that he had access to the account of an 82-year-old victim.

While living in Panama at the time, the scammer wrote and sent checks to South Florida with instructions to his co-conspirators to encash the checks and wire 50% of the funds to Suarez’s Miami-based firm, Online Electronics. Authorities say that Suarez forged the checks to resemble the signature of the victim displayed on their signature card for the same bank account.

Suarez was arrested in January 2025 in Panama and was extradited to South Florida to face the charges. For his crimes, he could spend 30 years behind bars plus a mandatory consecutive two-year sentence to any imprisonment term handed down by a judge.

The fraudster is slated for sentencing on September 29th, 2025, in Miami before United States District Court Judge Kathleen M. Williams.

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Disclaimer: Opinions expressed at The Daily Hodl are not investment advice. Investors should do their due diligence before making any high-risk investments in Bitcoin, cryptocurrency or digital assets. Please be advised that your transfers and trades are at your own risk, and any losses you may incur are your responsibility. The Daily Hodl does not recommend the buying or selling of any cryptocurrencies or digital assets, nor is The Daily Hodl an investment advisor. Please note that The Daily Hodl participates in affiliate marketing.

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World Liberty Financial, a Trump family-backed crypto company, dropped $47 worth of USD1 Stablecoin on each wallet that took part in the WLFI token sale.

The move is locked in the US dollar and supported by Treasury and Fiat reserves, USD1 will expand across the blockchain as a result of ChainLink’s CCIP integration.

Although USD1 has a market capitalization of $200 million, it is still small compared to Tether’s USDT or Circle’s USDC, it is noteworthy given the Trump connection and token use in MGX’s $2 billion investment in Binance.

The $47 payment is unlikely to be a life-changing amount for token holders, but it was enough to attract holders around X’s project and bump social chats.

So, the move will be equipped with world Liberty Financial equipment to launch its own crypto wallet in the coming months, as reported on Tuesday.

Anker Laptop Charger 140W

UGREEN Nexode 200W Charger

Anker Nano 100W 3-Port Charger

Thanks to Marius Van Der Wijden for creating the test case and statetest, and for helping the Besu team confirm the issue. Also, kudos to the Besu team, the EF security team, and Kevaundray Wedderburn. Additionally, thanks to Justin Traglia, Marius Van Der Wijden, Benedikt Wagner, and Kevaundray Wedderburn for proofreading. If you have any other questions/comments, find me on twitter at @asanso

tl;dr: Besu Ethereum execution client version 25.2.2 suffered from a consensus issue related to the EIP-196/EIP-197 precompiled contract handling for the elliptic curve alt_bn128 (a.k.a. bn254). The issue was fixed in release 25.3.0.
Here is the full CVE report.

N.B.: Part of this post requires some knowledge about elliptic curves (cryptography).

Introduction

The bn254 curve (also known as alt_bn128) is an elliptic curve used in Ethereum for cryptographic operations. It supports operations such as elliptic curve cryptography, making it crucial for various Ethereum features. Prior to EIP-2537 and the recent Pectra release, bn254 was the only pairing curve supported by the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). EIP-196 and EIP-197 define precompiled contracts for efficient computation on this curve. For more details about bn254, you can read here.

A significant security vulnerability in elliptic curve cryptography is the invalid curve attack, first introduced in the paper “Differential fault attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems”. This attack targets the use of points that do not lie on the correct elliptic curve, leading to potential security issues in cryptographic protocols. For non-prime order curves (like those appearing in pairing-based cryptography and in $G_2$ for bn254), it is especially important that the point is in the correct subgroup. If the point does not belong to the correct subgroup, the cryptographic operation can be manipulated, potentially compromising the security of systems relying on elliptic curve cryptography.

To check if a point P is valid in elliptic curve cryptography, it must be verified that the point lies on the curve and belongs to the correct subgroup. This is especially critical when the point P comes from an untrusted or potentially malicious source, as invalid or specially crafted points can lead to security vulnerabilities. Below is pseudocode demonstrating this process:

# Pseudocode for checking if point P is valid
def is_valid_point(P):
    if not is_on_curve(P):    
        return False
    if not is_in_subgroup(P):
        return False
    return True

Subgroup membership checks

As mentioned above, when working with any point of unknown origin, it is crucial to verify that it belongs to the correct subgroup, in addition to confirming that the point lies on the correct curve. For bn254, this is only necessary for $G_2$, because $G_1$ is of prime order. A straightforward method to test membership in $G$ is to multiply a point by $r$, where $r$ is the cofactor of the curve, which is the ratio between the order of the curve and the order of the base point.

However, this method can be costly in practice due to the large size of the prime $r$, especially for $G_2$. In 2021, Scott proposed a faster method for subgroup membership testing on BLS12 curves using an easily computable endomorphism, making the process 2×, 4×, and 4× quicker for different groups (this technique is the one specified in EIP-2537 for fast subgroup checks, as detailed in this document).
Later, Dai et al. generalized Scott’s technique to work for a broader range of curves, including BN curves, reducing the number of operations required for subgroup membership checks. In some cases, the process can be nearly free. Koshelev also introduced a method for non-pairing-friendly curves using the Tate pairing, which was eventually further generalized to pairing-friendly curves.

The Real Slim Shady

As you can see from the timeline at the end of this post, we received a report about a bug affecting Pectra EIP-2537 on Besu, submitted via the Pectra Audit Competition. We’re only lightly touching on that issue here, in case the original reporter wants to cover it in more detail. This post focuses specifically on the BN254 EIP-196/EIP-197 vulnerability.

The original reporter observed that in Besu, the is_in_subgroup check was performed before the is_on_curve check. Here’s an example of what that might look like:

# Pseudocode for checking if point P is valid
def is_valid_point(P):
    if not is_in_subgroup(P):    
        if not is_on_curve(P):
            return False  
        return False
    return True

Intrigued by the issue above on the BLS curve, we decided to take a look at the Besu code for the BN curve. To my great surprise, we found something like this:

# Pseudocode for checking if point P is valid
def is_valid_point(P):
    if not is_in_subgroup(P):    
        return False
    return True

Wait, what? Where is the is_on_curve check? Exactly—there isn’t one!!!

Now, to potentially bypass the is_valid_point function, all you’d need to do is provide a point that lies within the correct subgroup but isn’t actually on the curve.

But wait—is that even possible?

Well, yes—but only for particular, well-chosen curves. Specifically, if two curves are isomorphic, they share the same group structure, which means you could craft a point from the isomorphic curve that passes subgroup checks but doesn’t lie on the intended curve.

Sneaky, right?

Did you say isomorpshism?

Feel free to skip this section if you’re not interested in the details—we’re about to go a bit deeper into the math.

Let $\mathbb{F}_q$ be a finite field with characteristic different from 2 and 3, meaning $q = p^f$ for some prime $p \geq 5$ and integer $f \geq 1$. We consider elliptic curves $E$ over $\mathbb{F}_q$ given by the short Weierstraß equation:

where $A$ and $B$ are constants satisfying $4A^3 + 27B^2 \neq 0$.^[This condition ensures the curve is non-singular; if it were violated, the equation would define a singular point lacking a well-defined tangent, making it impossible to perform meaningful self-addition. In such cases, the object is not technically an elliptic curve.]

Curve Isomorphisms

Two elliptic curves are considered isomorphic^[To exploit the vulnerabilities described here, we really want isomorphic curves, not just isogenous curves.] if they can be related by an affine change of variables. Such transformations preserve the group structure and ensure that point addition remains consistent. It can be shown that the only possible transformations between two curves in short Weierstraß form take the shape:

for some nonzero $e \in \mathbb{F}_q$. Applying this transformation to the curve equation results in:

The $j$-invariant of a curve is defined as:

Every element of $\mathbb{F}_q$ can be a possible $j$-invariant.^[Both BLS and BN curves have a j-invariant equal to 0, which is really special.] When two elliptic curves share the same $j$-invariant, they are either isomorphic (in the sense described above) or they are twists of each other.^[We omit the discussion about twists here, as they are not relevant to this case.]

Exploitability

At this point, all that’s left is to craft a suitable point on a carefully chosen curve, and voilà—le jeu est fait.

You can try the test vector using this link and enjoy the ride.

Conclusion

In this post, we explored the vulnerability in Besu’s implementation of elliptic curve checks. This flaw, if exploited, could allow an attacker to craft a point that passes subgroup membership checks but does not lie on the actual curve. The Besu team has since addressed this issue in release 25.3.0. While the issue was isolated to Besu and did not affect other clients, discrepancies like this raise important concerns for multi-client ecosystems like Ethereum. A mismatch in cryptographic checks between clients can result in divergent behavior—where one client accepts a transaction or block that another rejects. This kind of inconsistency can jeopardize consensus and undermine trust in the network’s uniformity, especially when subtle bugs remain unnoticed across implementations. This incident highlights why rigorous testing and robust security practices are absolutely essential—especially in blockchain systems, where even minor cryptographic missteps can ripple out into major systemic vulnerabilities. Initiatives like the Pectra audit competition play a crucial role in proactively surfacing these issues before they reach production. By encouraging diverse eyes to scrutinize the code, such efforts strengthen the overall resilience of the ecosystem.

Timeline

• 15-03-2025 – Bug affecting Pectra EIP-2537 on Besu reported via the Pectra Audit Competition.
• 17-03-2025 – Discovered and reported the EIP-196/EIP-197 issue to the Besu team.
• 17-03-2025 – Marius Van Der Wijden created a test case and statetest to reproduce the issue.
• 17-03-2025 – The Besu team promptly acknowledged and fixed the issue.

Plus: Sam Altman’s orbs land in the US

GM. If the crypto market was a smoothie, it’d be a wild blend of gains, regrets, and mystery berries.

Europe is lagging…

News drops: crypto advocacy groups want clarity on staking, Sam Altman’s World enters the US + more

There was blood. There were tears. There was A LOT of grinding. But you did it!

Season 7 is officially wrapped. Big congrats to everyone who scored a reward!

Now, let’s get those airdrops sorted. Winners should’ve already gotten an email with all the info we need. We’ll be collecting details until May 11, and the airdrops will start flying out from May 12.

So, that’s that. But let’s be honest… you’re not done chasing prizes yet, are you?

Good news: Missions are still live, still rewarding, and still waiting for you

Market flavor today

Things are looking pretty good – no big price decreases, and the Fear and Greed index upgraded from Neutral to Greed today.

That’s likely because people are betting the Fed might cut rates sooner than expected (and rate cuts are usually a W for crypto).

Now, nobody’s expecting much from the next Fed meeting on Wednesday – but the June 18 meeting? That one might actually bring some action

So why are rate cut hopes rising? Recent US macro data: the Q1 2025 GDP numbers and March PCE Inflation report.

Let’s start with GDP, which measures the total value of everything a country produces and shows whether its economy is growing or shrinking.

And, uhh… it’s not lookin’ great.

The US economy shrank last quarter – the first time that’s happened since early 2022. GDP decreased by 0.3%, while economists had been hoping for a 0.4% increase.

Why the sudden dip? Imports. Tons of them. *Trump voice* Yuge amounts. Companies rushed to stock up on goods before Trump’s new tariffs kicked in, leading to a 41% jump in imports.

And since imports count as a negative in GDP math (because that’s money flowing out of the country), it dragged the whole number down.

A shrinking economy usually suggests lower demand, which would push the Fed toward cutting rates or at least keeping them steady to give growth a boost.

But – and it’s a big but – this GDP drop seems to be a one-time thing. It wasn’t broad economic weakness, just businesses panic-buying, so the Fed probably won’t freak out over that.

Now, let’s talk inflation. Things are complicated.

The Fed’s favorite inflation gauge – the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index – jumped to 3.6% last quarter. That’s up from 2.4% the quarter before and way above the Fed’s 2% target. So, inflation is still a problem.

But if you just look at March, PCE inflation rose only 2.3% year-over-year, down from 2.5% in February. That suggests inflation might be cooling off month by month, even though the quarterly number looks hot.

So yeah, this new data isn’t exactly making the Fed’s life easier.

Now, when the central bankers meet next week, they’ll probably focus more on inflation than the GDP hiccup.

The increase in quarterly inflation will make them cautious about cutting rates too soon. But the slower inflation growth in March could give them some confidence that things are headed in the right direction.

So for now? Expect the Fed to keep rates steady while they wait for clearer signs that inflation is really chilling out before considering any cuts.

Memecoin harvest

Today’s gainers make zero sense, but your wallet doesn’t seem to care.

Data as of 04:50 AM EST.

Check out these memecoins and plenty more here.

Europe has a lot of things to be proud of:

• Universal healthcare;

• Stunning old towns, legendary art, and architecture;

• Pizza (thx Italy), wine (thx France);

• Eurovision (and the vibe of pretending to love your neighbouring countries when you usually can’t stand them).

Y’know, some nice fun stuff goin’ on.

But when it comes to crypto? Oh boy. EUROPE’S SO BEHIND.

Let’s take a look at the US for comparison.

Donald Trump signed an executive order to start building a US Bitcoin reserve.

On top of that, individual states are racing to get involved. For example, North Carolina’s House of Representatives just passed a bill allowing the state treasurer to invest public money into approved crypto assets. It’s now heading to the Senate.

And it’s not just the US:

• Dubai’s been all-in on crypto;

• One of the regions in Bhutan has added Bitcoin, Ethereum, and BNB to its reserves.

Overall, countries all over the world are making moves to embrace crypto – and fast.

And what’s Europe been up to lately?

Well… they banned privacy coins (like Monero and Zcash) and anonymous crypto accounts starting in 2027.

Not exactly an open-minded approach.

This is something that ex-Binance CEO CZ pointed out at the Token2049 conference in Dubai – the US is adopting crypto and also nudging other countries to get involved, but Europe is barely in the conversation.

(Except for Montenegro, which he said has been open to crypto.)

But the reality is simple:

The rest of the world is catching on and moving fast. The longer Europe waits, the harder – and more expensive – it’ll be to catch up.

News drops

About 30 crypto advocacy groups have asked the SEC to set clear rules for crypto staking and similar services. They explained that staking is a technical function, not an investment.

Sam Altman’s crypto project, World, is now live in the US. Their weird little iris-scanning devices, called orbs, are already set up in Atlanta, LA, Miami, Nashville, Austin, and San Francisco.

Coinbase is delisting the MOVE token – the one used on the Movement Network blockchain. Trading will stop on May 15.

The US Treasury wants to block Cambodia’s Huione Group from using the American banking system. Officials say the company’s been helping North Korea’s Lazarus Group launder stolen crypto.

Natasha Lyonne – best known for her roles in Russian Doll and Orange Is the New Black – will direct and star in a new sci-fi movie called Uncanny Valley. The film will explore the blurry line between human performance and AI, and they’ll even use generative AI to help create some of the visuals.

Changelly is throwing a 10-year anniversary party with a $100K+ prize pool! Open the Changelly app, sign up or log in, get a free spin (plus another if you make a transaction), and see what you won.*

*Sponsored

Juicy memes

For P2SH transactions, an example redemption script:

 CScript((my_private_key.pub,OP_CHECKSIG,OP_IF,OP_1,OP_ELSE,OP_1,OP_ENDIF))

Works if the expression is true. Executes the IF statement. That is, the first signature matches. However, if the initial signature does not match the public key, instead of performing another statement, the site will return:

SendRawTransaction RPC Error-26: Non-monitoring-Script-Verify-Flag (must be zero if signature fails (multi-)SIG operation)

but, VerifyScript(txin.scriptSig, (txin_scriptPubKey), tx, 0, (SCRIPT_VERIFY_P2SH,)) Does not throw errors. This is also how you generate a signature.

def create_OP_CHECKSIG_signature(tx, txin_scriptPubKey, seckey):
    
    sighash = SignatureHash(txin_scriptPubKey, tx, 0, SIGHASH_ALL)
    signature = seckey.sign(sighash) + bytes((SIGHASH_ALL))
    return signature
#usage
sig = create_OP_CHECKSIG_signature(tx, redeemscript, my_private_key)

Any help is appreciated.

I would like to send a raw transaction, but I have a problem. I’m using a RegTest node. P2PKH address was generated in seed breeding
mjnJj4TFyU4jYrTVUHMA632UmuUMssZHq4

Next, as usual, generateToAddress 101 block

I’ve never touched

(
    {
        "txid": "6481bbba699177c735c3e336735674641459bbbe2aba85a1b8be233df8f36938",
        "vout": 0,
        "address": "mjnJj4TFyU4jYrTVUHMA632UmuUMssZHq4",
        "label": "",
        "scriptPubKey": "76a9142ec7cc30ef662cf7c757e3460995f2682871207688ac",
        "amount": 50,
        "confirmations": 101,
        "spendable": true,
        "solvable": false,
        "parent_descs": (
            "addr(mjnJj4TFyU4jYrTVUHMA632UmuUMssZHq4)#rwelz9me"
        ),
        "safe": true
    }
)

And then I make a transaction. Just send a little Saturday to another empty address

My Step: 1. Create an empty transaction with one input and two outputs (one for change)

CREATE TRANSACTION START
== Amount to send (sats): 100000000
== Fee (sats): 1000000
== Get UTXO id for pay: 6481bbba699177c735c3e336735674641459bbbe2aba85a1b8be233df8f36938
== Reversed UTXO id: 3869f3f83d23beb8a185ba2abebb59146474567336e3c335c7779169babb8164
== Full generated tx: {"version":1,"inputs":({"txid":"3869f3f83d23beb8a185ba2abebb59146474567336e3c335c7779169babb8164","vout":0,"scriptSig":"76a9142ec7cc30ef662cf7c757e3460995f2682871207688ac","sequence":4294967295}),"outputs":({"value":100000000,"scriptPubKey":"76a914796e2d78cff63c21f8ee823052b5362bc2cc2af388ac"},{"value":4899000000,"scriptPubKey":"76a914929b53a5d57f12e924b9c6d58524faec5c5cfee788ac"}),"locktime":0}
CREATE TRANSACTION END

2. Next, serialize it

SERIALIZATION START
== Version (4 bytes LE):  01000000
== Input Count (1 bytes Compact Size): 01
==== TXID (32 bytes Natural Byte Order): 3869f3f83d23beb8a185ba2abebb59146474567336e3c335c7779169babb8164
==== VOut (4 bytes LE):  00000000
==== ScriptSig Size (1 bytes Compact Size): 19
==== ScriptSig (25 bytes): 76a9142ec7cc30ef662cf7c757e3460995f2682871207688ac
==== Sequence (4 bytes LE):  ffffffff
== Output Count: (1 bytes Compact Size): 02
==== Amount (8 bytes LE): 00e1f50500000000
==== ScriptPubKey Size (1 bytes Compact Size): 19
==== ScriptPubKey (25 bytes): 76a914796e2d78cff63c21f8ee823052b5362bc2cc2af388ac
==== Amount (8 bytes LE): c0ce002401000000
==== ScriptPubKey Size (1 bytes Compact Size): 19
==== ScriptPubKey (25 bytes): 76a914929b53a5d57f12e924b9c6d58524faec5c5cfee788ac
==== Locktime (4 bytes LE): 00000000
== SIGHASH_ALL (4 bytes LE):  01000000
== Final Buffer: 01000000013869f3f83d23beb8a185ba2abebb59146474567336e3c335c7779169babb8164000000001976a9142ec7cc30ef662cf7c757e3460995f2682871207688acffffffff0200e1f505000000001976a914796e2d78cff63c21f8ee823052b5362bc2cc2af388acc0ce0024010000001976a914929b53a5d57f12e924b9c6d58524faec5c5cfee788ac0000000001000000
SERIALIZATION END

3. Please sign

 SIGNING START
== WIF: cRcGtESEBF1ztuwtftM7Ds9Mcu1x6PtCK1TiXKTvShZF43ZtVYVY
== Private Key: 7828a7d17099c3d5baeaa4a8de47d97038e9cefd62d5d04e4736e47fe0a81779
== Public Key: 03a1dbe0aea6bf483bc00ed3d101f54e0b1e06e9c2e5103de5950b135ff055f107
== Double sha256 of serialized tx: 08b7c9af7310ff1dbeea59575dd851565b52046a03631351b5aec94100655b91
== Der signature with sighash: 304502210085016fb2b7cc850ca2560da9e5873c922643388af63ae5a496899acd6e94537c022077df3eba94465a22f764338a9200865a591c7998206c9fbcf22080d9152f45af01
== All size (1 bytes Compact Size): 6b
== Sig len (1 bytes Compact Size): 48
== Pub Key (1 bytes Compact Size): 21
== ScriptSig Size (1 bytes Compact Size): 6c
== ScriptSig (108 bytes): 6b48304502210085016fb2b7cc850ca2560da9e5873c922643388af63ae5a496899acd6e94537c022077df3eba94465a22f764338a9200865a591c7998206c9fbcf22080d9152f45af012103a1dbe0aea6bf483bc00ed3d101f54e0b1e06e9c2e5103de5950b135ff055f107
SIGNING END

what happened ? der signature? Does it have it in my data and Argo? please help me. I wrote the code to send raw transactions, investigation procedures, but I think I made a mistake somewhere

4. Final Hex and Command

bitcoin-cli -regtest \
       -rpcuser=bitcoin \
       -rpcpassword=ggbUUhXBbgUVDd2vdaMRb-KVYusRXbV-fVgjdMMdOWA \
       -rpcwallet="app_wallet" \
        sendrawtransaction 01000000013869f3f83d23beb8a185ba2abebb59146474567336e3c335c7779169babb8164000000006b48304502210085016fb2b7cc850ca2560da9e5873c922643388af63ae5a496899acd6e94537c022077df3eba94465a22f764338a9200865a591c7998206c9fbcf22080d9152f45af012103a1dbe0aea6bf483bc00ed3d101f54e0b1e06e9c2e5103de5950b135ff055f107ffffffff0200e1f505000000001976a914796e2d78cff63c21f8ee823052b5362bc2cc2af388acc0ce0024010000001976a914929b53a5d57f12e924b9c6d58524faec5c5cfee788ac00000000 0.10 200000